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This Afghanistan War in the Light of
America’s Post Vietnam Military
Culture: The Logic of Asymmetrical
Death and Commemoration
Mark Meigs
1 American military culture is deployed from the top down along a hierarchical chain of
command. The strategy of this culture is planned. Its tactics are carefully crafted. Both
are diffused by highly self-conscious leaders and repeated by others,  over a complex
system of military communications where they stimulate and motivate the sensibilities of
individuals  throughout  the  entire  military  organization.  This  culture  from  above
originates  among  a  handful  of  senior  officers  with  a  similar  education,  career  and
professional experience that started in Vietnam and traversed the American military’s
darkest days in the 1970’s. Eventually, it meets the diverse emotions and loyalties of very
different individuals with very different experiences. This culture from above can either
successfully help keep the diverse institution organized and transmit back up the line of
command the reassuring messages of shared values, or the culture of the upper echelons
can lose  its  hold  on the  younger  men and women down below. Expressed like  this,
military culture—essentially the meanings attached to death and destruction and the
threat of death and destruction—can seem like a sinister attempt at the manipulation of
people’s  lives  and  ideas.  But  within  an  organization  dependent  on  teamwork  and
intended for violence against other similar organizations, using this tool to its greatest
advantage seems necessary for successful operations.
2 Current  military  literature,  speeches  by  high-ranking  officers  and  testimony  before
Congress, all express this military cultural strategy as a “non-negotiable contract with
the people of the United States to fight and win, and win decisively, the nation’s wars.”
The strategy of military culture is in the word “decisively.” The enemy will be forced to
do or stop doing, what it had not been willing to do or stop doing before. The interests of
the United States  will  be advanced.  A fundamental  difference with the strategy,  and
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therefore the military culture, of other countries can be measured with this phrase. When
a senior European general in Brussels says that the EU’s military ambitions do not include
being “in the war-fighting game,” he displays a European military strategy and culture
turned  away,  since  World  War  II,  from the  possibility  and  the  necessity  of  decisive
victory, its strategic possibilities and human costs.1
3 Aiming for decisive victory in all conflicts erases openly expressed doubts and hesitations
on the part of the American military. It would be difficult to exaggerate the gulf that this
produces between American military personnel and their counterparts elsewhere. Where
other military groups must jockey for position in alliance with the American military or
against it–or in the manner of the French since Charles de Gaulle, forever attempting to
define a third position–the Americans can focus on winning the conflict.  While other
military cultures produce a rhetoric that must diminish the decisive acts of the American
military,  the  Americans  may be  counted upon to  maximize  the  effects  of  their  own
actions. Where representatives of other military cultures will speak of the intransigent
history of armed conflict and the recurring political difficulties that follow the conflicts,
American  military  spokesmen  will  sound  as  though  ending  conflicts  in  a  manner
advantageous  to  the United States  were inevitable  even when the narrative  of  their
successful exploits will stop somewhere short of political negotiation, which, in any case,
falls to the lot of diplomats and politicians.
4 In Afghanistan, at the moment, this difference due to the assumption of dominance on
the part of Americans can reduce American military activities and their proponents, to a
condition of incoherence when viewed from the outside. At the time of writing, December
2001, imminent military victory makes American strategic calculations appear correct to
almost everyone. The translation of military victory, however, into some stable political
solution may easily bring back earlier doubts. Outside commentators have worried that to
fight the Taliban regime of Afghanistan is not necessarily to fight terrorism. They have
worried about the difficulty the United States will find itself in, and will lead the rest of
the world into, if it continues the war against other states sympathetic to and helpful to
terrorists. They point out that the United States has sometimes supported forces very like
terrorists,  with no legitimate mandate,  against  legitimate national forces.  They see a
connection between the attraction of a destructive cause like that of Osama bin Laden for
the disaffected peoples of the world and the domination of the United States in cultural
and economic terms. Some claim outright, and many more suspect, that United States
policies, foreign, economic, and cultural–in fact the dominance of the United States in all
these areas–has led to terrorist acts, as people with no political voice that counts in the
United States, and few military means, seek to correct these lacks. Spokesmen for the
American military, on the other hand, can speak of the unquestionably improved position
of the United States, vis-à-vis terrorism, with the destruction of each Taliban camp. They
will speak of an effective deterrence. They can also speak with brutal frankness about the
connection between American business expansion and American military might.2 That
the United States should dominate in the conflicts of the world is their mission, after all.
Being able to dominate,  they are not required to seek out negotiating strategies and
angles. Their mission is to deliver the enemy to the negotiating table, “with his will to
fight,” exhausted.3
5 Lest this version of the strategy and effects of American military culture seem simplistic,
even tautological–expressible perhaps by the phrase, “the dominant seek to dominate,”
and its corollary, “might makes right,” it should be remembered that the defeat of the
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American military in Vietnam remains ever present in the memories of senior officers
today, and has left its mark on this culture. In Vietnam, the dominant United States did
not dominate. Might lost its way. Senior officers, who were lieutenants and captains then,
are determined not to make the same mistakes again. 
6 Some of the mistakes of Vietnam were political. The first of these political mistakes of the
war, which both caused and aggravated military difficulties, was that at times there was
no viable South Vietnamese government fighting the war with the United States. As the
United States took more and more responsibility for prosecuting the war, it took more
and more responsibility for running the country. Withdrawing from the war required
patching together South Vietnamese institutions. The American military consciously tries
to avoid this problem now. Secondly, military authorities today, insist that they cannot
and will not prosecute a war that the people of the United States do not support. The
military will seemingly use every means at its disposal to obtain and retain that popular
support; it will use all the cultural tactics at its disposal to maintain that support. But the
military establishment does not wish to find itself separated from the emotional and
material base of the country again. Vietnam was a long and indecisive war providing
ample time for relations between army and civil population to degrade. The United States
Army will try to win quickly.4 The third major error in the Vietnam debacle, and the most
important as it is remembered by the military, had to do with military strategy, and
therefore  has  been most  susceptible  to  the  reform of  military  doctrine  and culture-
building since. General Westmoreland decided upon a strategy of attrition. His plan for
winning the war was not a plan for a decisive stroke against the enemy’s concentrated
military force, but the gradual wearing down of the enemy. This strategy of attrition
separated American military cultural strategy from its historical roots in a strategy of
decisive  annihilation,  at  the  same  time  that  it  separated  strategy  from the  military
cultural tactics of deploying death, as we will see. It is worth considering these three
errors of Vietnam strategy because they have left such a large impact on the military
culture of the United States today.
7 The reluctance of American military authorities to replace local authority explains in part
President George Bush’s refusal to continue the war in Iraq up the road to Baghdad to
unseat Saddam Hussein. American military men regretted that decision at the time, out of
a sense of frustration when total victory seemed possible. Since then official regrets are
expressed  only  in  strictly  military  terms:  they  regret  having  left  so  much  of  the
Republican Guard intact to continue the military domination of the country.5 This same
reluctance  of  the  Pentagon  to  engage  in  “nation  building,”  explains  much  of  the
hesitation on the way to Kabul in the present war.  The advance towards the Afghan
capital stopped, giving time for Pashtun leaders, and others to defect from the Taliban.
The reason seems clear.  Without  sufficient  Pashtun support  on the side of  the anti-
Taliban forces, it is unlikely that any coalition of ethnic groups will be able to govern
Afghanistan. No American military man imagines that outside authority will be able to
impose a coalition on the Afghans. The soldiers of the Afghanistan Northern Alliance
eventually  did  enter  Kabul,  and  continued  their  advances  against  the  requests  of
American military authorities, who must now hope that this show of strength and unity
presages the unexpected emergence of a Northern Alliance capable of ruling.
8 To avoid losing the support of the American public, the American military must present
its wars as just–hence the sometimes overblown names of operations: “Urgent Fury,” in
Grenada in 1987, “Just Cause,” in Panama, in 1989. But above all, the engagements must
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be successful,  brief,  decisive,  and cost  as  little  as  possible  in lives.  As  elements  in a
military culture none of this seems surprising, and it would be hard to fault any of these
objectives once the necessity for war has been admitted. The surprise must be in the
willingness of other military cultures to expend lives in a profligate way for ill-defined
goals over a long period of time. In Vietnam, the strategy of attrition eventually adopted
by General Westmoreland, had done exactly that. In July 1965, General Westmoreland
outlined his plan for the use of greater numbers of American troops in his “search-and-
destroy” strategy. His plan called for the build-up of American and allied troops during
the rest of 1965, a prolonged period of offensive action during 1966, and a year, or a year
and a half for the “defeat and destruction of the remaining enemy forces and base areas."
6 With hindsight, anyone can see with certainty what military men should have seen at
the time: that this was a vague plan for a long war in which the American will to win, and
eventually the American will to destroy all resistance in Vietnam, would be pitted against
North Vietnamese will and capacity to continue that resistance. Such a plan might at
some time have lead [led] to the annihilation of the enemy, but at a great cost to both
sides and not in a decisive action. 
9 According to the military historian Russell  Weigley, this strategy of attrition resulted
from a series of Cold War calculations that tried to balance the burdens of containing
Communist  aggression  militarily  while  not  bankrupting  the  economy  of  the  United
States. The solution, according to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in his well-known
address of December 1953, was “a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.” In other words,
the  United  States  would  prepare  “massive  retaliation,”  anywhere  it  chose,  to  Soviet
aggression. Dulles especially wished to avoid committing American troops to Southeast
Asia, where the French were engaged against the Viet Minh. By May of 1954, of course,
the  French  army  had  been  defeated  at  Dienbienphu  and  the  strategy  of  “massive
retaliation,”  looked  too  rigid  to  be  an  effective  defense  against  serious  communist
aggressions on a limited scale. 
10 In  the  years  that  followed,  civilian  and  military  strategists,  for  example  Henry  A.
Kissinger  in his  1957 book,  Nuclear  Weapons  and Foreign  Policy,  and military men too,
notably General Maxwell Taylor, developed various ways in which American containment
of  communism could  match aggressions  with  graduated responses  and limited  aims.
These strategists of limited war aims and means called for a significant break with an
American military tradition of a strategy of annihilation so characteristic of the American
Civil War and successful American military planning in World War II. Departing from this
successful model in the late 1950’s, Kissinger wrote, “It is important for our leadership to
understand that total victory is no longer possible and for the public to become aware of
the dangers of pressing for such a course."7 General Maxwell D. Taylor of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff eventually coined the expression “strategy of flexible response,” in promoting
American readiness to fight limited wars calibrated to different degrees of communist
aggression.8
11 During the Administration of  John Kennedy and under the influence of  Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara, the choices between “massive retaliation,” and “strategy of
flexible response,” changed, both taking on the look of warfare measured out in careful
doses. At his former position at the head of the Ford Motor Company, McNamara had
been known for quantitative systems analysis. “Massive retaliation” became the “second
strike,” or the notion of “assured destruction.” If the Soviet Union attacked the United
States with nuclear missiles, the United States would have a sufficient number of missiles
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left to cause “unacceptable damage” to Soviet society.9 Unacceptable damage came to
mean the death of one fourth of the population and the destruction of one fourth of
Soviet industrial capacity to the numbers-oriented McNamara.
12 At the same time, and in harmony both with General Taylor’s doubts about the usefulness
of nuclear weapons, and with President Kennedy’s desire to throw off the passive look of
Cold War deterrence, the Kennedy Administration committed itself to a series of limited
aggressions,  first  against  Cuba,  then in Vietnam.  In  Vietnam,  under  the quantitative
management of McNamara, flexible response became calibrated attrition measured with
kill ratios and body counts. If the United States forces could kill enough of the enemy
while losing few enough of their own, eventually the communists would run out of men,
or so went the strategic calculations of McNamara and Westmoreland.
13 Under General Taylor’s influence, the United States Army’s move toward a doctrine of
limited war was reflected in changes to the 1962 Army Field Service Regulations (FM
100-5). This manual that translates military doctrine into action, had always stated that
“The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy’s armed
forces and his will to fight.” In 1962, the phrase was dropped. In those days of limited war
and counter-insurgency, it had sounded too much like the promotion of unlimited war,
which now necessarily meant the use of nuclear weapons. The clear aim of “destroying
the  enemy’s  armed  forces,”  had  been  replaced  with  the  careful  counting  of  war’s
destruction to arrive at something close to what the principle civilian strategist of the
1960’s, Thomas C. Schelling, called “compellence,” a neologism that meant causing an
opponent to act in a desirable way.
Military strategy can no longer be thought of, as it could be for some countries in
some areas, as the science of military victory. It is now equally, if not more, the art
of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence... It is the power to hurt, not military
strength  in  the  traditional  sense,  that  inhere  in  our  most  impressive  military
capabilities  at  the  present  time...  And  it  is  pain  and violence,  not  force  in  the
traditional  sense,  that  inheres  also  in  some  of  the  least  impressive  military
capabilities of the present time–the plastic bomb, the terrorist’s bullet, the burnt
crops, and the tortured farmer.10
14 According to historian,  Russell  Weigley,  what  Shelling meant  was  that  in  the age of
atomic bombs that could not be used, violence must be used diplomatically.
15 Linking  attrition  to  limited  war–thus  body counts–also  linked this  strategic  error  of
Vietnam to the basic tactic of military culture, the deployment of death. Certainly death
rests near the heart of all military thought now and throughout history. The strategy of
attrition and counting in the Vietnam war disgusted a generation of military because it
used death in so many perverse ways. These men now command the United States Army.
The body counting and kill ratios of the Vietnam war encouraged officers to exaggerate
the importance of enemy soldiers their units had killed and the quantity and quality of
enemy equipment they had destroyed, while minimizing the importance of their own
losses. Concentrating on the enemy’s wounds rather than on the injuries to your own
soldiers is psychologically de-motivating. If a unit has an efficient kill ratio, the suspicion
arises that it is a unit of barbarians. But if the unit has a low, inefficient ratio, if, for
example, it loses more men than it kills, those men have been lost for nothing. In either
case  the  training,  patriotism,  physical  and  mental  health,  bravery  and  sacrifice  of
American soldiers along with the leadership of their officers either surviving or lost on
the field of attrition, could count for nothing in the slow attainment of victory counted
only in enemy dead. This strategy that sapped the motivation out of individuals doing the
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fighting, encouraged officers to miscount while it  revolted people back in the United
States and allowed for a very long war. When your own soldiers are either successful
barbarians or forgotten canon-fodder,  the national  motivation cannot be maintained.
Pain  administered  to  the  communist  forces  of  Vietnam  under  such  circumstances
produced the opposite of “compellence.” 
16 The failure of Westmoreland’s Vietnam strategy and the wedge it  drove between the
people of the United States and the Army inspired a generation of officers to reform that
institution in the 1970’s and 1980’s and give it the organization and culture it has today.
Through their reforms they have rebelled against what they considered to be the non-
strategy  of  attrition in  Vietnam,  and also  the  “compellence”  thesis  of  Schelling  and
against all limited war theories as well as their conclusions taken from the Vietnam era.
Rear Admiral  J.  C.  Wylie,  in the aftermath of  Vietnam, considered that  while atomic
weapons  were  too  destructive  to be  used,  limited  war  must  eventually  be  lost  by  a
country like the United States. An economically and politically dominant country, like the
United States, could never wish to advance policy through violence, but only to preserve
the  status  quo  against  better  motivated  foes  who  had  more  to  gain  in  any  limited
engagement. Russell Weigley himself, in his book of 1973, concluded that, “the history of
usable combat may at last be reaching its end."11 All these strategic theories had counted
up the costs of war in the wrong way, according to reforming United States Army officers
of the post-Vietnam decades. In their reforms, they would find a new way to wage war
successfully.
17 Today’s American military does not reveal kill ratios and may not calculate them. This
author, at least, has found none for the Gulf War. The official history of the Gulf War tells
of American tank crews “killing” enemy tanks in some detail, and from this information
the reader can begin to put together his own ratio, but the emphasis in the book, as it was
in military briefings and media coverage during the war, is on the superior equipment,
tactics and strategy that quickly won the war and could have annihilated the enemy.12 By
mid-December, there have only been three American soldiers killed in Afghanistan, and
those by an American bomb. Figures on enemy dead are vague, to say the least. On the
other  hand,  any  examination  of  the  United  States  Army’s  web  site  reveals  a
preoccupation with the death of American service personnel and their memorialization
that  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  efficiency  with  which  they  have  dispatched enemy
soldiers or equipment. The preponderant number of American military personnel killed
in this war, 125, were of course those who died when the commercial airliner was crashed
into the Pentagon. At a memorial  service held outside the building opposite the side
where the damage had been done, speeches were made by President George W. Bush,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others. Lt. Gen. John A. Van Alstyne, director
of the Pentagon Family Assistance Center, spoke for the families of the dead, saying “all
they asked for was that their loved ones be remembered for their daily heroic service
leading up to the day of the attacks and ultimate sacrifice.” President Bush promised that
the country “will always honor their memory.” He went on to say, “Unlike our enemies,
we value every life, and we mourn every loss—yet we are not afraid.” Secretary Rumsfeld
said  that  “these  heroic  deaths  reminds  (sic)  us  of  a  new kind of  evil...  ”13 That  the
Pentagon should memorialize its dead comes as no surprise, but that these dead should
be memorialized as heroes in their daily work in a large office-building demonstrates a
deliberate change in military mentality and public relations since Vietnam when there
were no parades for returning soldiers.
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18 Among the reforms of the Army since those days has been an emphasis on army quality of
life, family unity and recognition of family participation and support of any soldier, man
or woman, who follows the job of soldiering often far from home for long periods.14 When
viewed from this family point of view, all military engagement is seen as sacrifice and
daily routine activity is viewed as heroic. The contrast with the era of Robert McNamara
and his quantitative systems analysis approach to winning Vietnam efficiently could not
be greater. The intangibles of loyalty and esprit de corps are constantly reinforced. The
damage to the Pentagon itself became personified in an Army news story of October 9,
2001. The story described the damage to the building and the people who worked there,
as  a  crime,  but  the  building  and the  people  in  it  remain  steadfast,  healing  quickly.
Remembrance immediately becomes motivation in this military culture.
Four weeks after the Sept. 11 terrorist attack, the gaping wound left in the south
side  of  the  Pentagon  appears  cleaned  and  sterilized...  Inside,  the  undamaged
majority of the Pentagon, soldiers, Marines, airmen, sailors and civilians continue
serving  as  before  the  attack.  One  could  hardly  guess  the  calamity  that  had
transpired  here  from  viewing  the  seemingly  normal  operations  in  this  massive
complex... Standing directly outside the impact-area the gap looks rather small in
relation to the wide sides of the edifice. The collapsed floors have been removed,
and the evidence of violence has been extricated... Salvaged, a two-foot-diameter
cast-iron shield representing the Army Reserve is blackened by fire but hardly the
worse  for  wear.  Perhaps  one  day  it  will  be  placed  as  is,  thoughtfully  and
appropriately, with a plaque of remembrance. For now, it leans silently against an
unlit wall... Yes, we will surely remember the Pentagon and related World Trade
Center attacks, just as we do the Alamo.15
19 On October 24, Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White and Army Chief of Staff General
Eric K. Shinseki, distributed medals to seventy military and civilian personnel who had
distinguished themselves in the Pentagon attack. Purple Hearts were given to 27 soldiers
for wounds,  and 19 civilians received the equivalent  Defense of  Freedom medal.  The
Defense of Freedom medal was newly invented for this occasion and emphasizes both the
new close  identity  between military  and civilian  sentiment  that  the  army wishes  to
maintain, but also the broad definition of heroism and sacrifice in the reformed army.
The  Soldiers  Medal  was  presented  to  27  soldiers  for  heroism.  Four  commercial
contractors received the Decoration for Distinguished Civilian Service, presumably for
work related to cleaning the damaged site. Again, service, whether heroic or not, was
commemorated. The names of all recipients, their rank, award and home were listed. No
service to the military will go un-remarked, whether by a purchasing agent for the Army
executive dining-room,  or  a  chief  of  compensations and entitlements,  both of  whom
received a purple heart for wounds.
20 Sentiment and memorialization come from below in the Pentagon hierarchy as well. A
report dated October 3, 2001, by Staff Sgt. John Valceanu, “Commentary: Notes Help Keep
Memories Alive,” diffused messages written by family members on a makeshift memorial
outside the Pentagon on the Army Link News. “First I want to say that you are an amazing
person and have touched me and others deeply within all our hearts,” said one such note.
“You were like a best friend, mother and aunt,” said another. In Valceanu’s report, the
notes were followed by long lists naming the dead with rank or civilian status, specialty
and age. In the lists, civilians were mixed with military personnel, non-commissioned
persons  with  Lieutenant  Colonels  and  a  Lieutenant  General,  men  were  mixed  with
women, as if the note addressed to a “best friend, mother and aunt,” could have been to a
male colonel or a woman file clerk, and carried the same emotional weight. The different
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services—Army,  Navy,  Marines,  Airforce—seem  to  have  been  segregated.  The  strong
emotional message of sacrifice, service, continuity and the ubiquity of heroism can travel
up and down the military hierarchy: “Your memory will be carried on in our hearts and
through  your  son  and  unborn  child.”  “Please  show  us  your  twinkling  eyes  in  the
sunlight.” The messages connecting the living with the dead can be unabashedly patriotic
as  well  as  uniting  the  military  family  with  the  people  of  the  United  States,  while
designating outsiders as well.  “I  am so very sorry that your life had to end this way
because people are hateful and evil.” “Let us remember the price they paid just for being
Americans.”16 
21 Placing the line between insiders  and outsiders  requires delicacy in military culture.
More than 125 names were on the list in Staff Sgt. John Valceanu’s commentary. Some of
these may have been identified as not being victims of the September 11 attack in later
reports. In many speeches and references, the number of victims is given as 189. The 125
killed Pentagon personnel added to 64 people aboard the airplane that exploded against
the building results in that number. The number of hijackers in the airplane, however,
was never mentioned in a memorial context. In American memorials, all the dead belong
to one side. Unlike in Vietnam, the American military does not draw public attention to
the enemy dead.
22 This asymmetric memorialization of the dead related to the asymmetry of casualties in
the current war in Afghanistan come from several causes. First, sophisticated American
technology should  protect  American soldiers  from large  numbers  of  casualties  while
inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. Soviet technological superiority during their
war in Afghanistan did not protect them sufficiently, but then their technology proved to
be ineffective against American equipment in the Gulf War. American technology seems
much better suited to this task. Second, the Soviet Army was fighting a Vietnam-style
ground war against guerrillas. American soldiers will not fight a war again where they
serve as surrogates in someone else’s civil war. They will therefore maintain a certain
distance through the use of technology and will not take the place of Afghan soldiers
fighting the Taliban only to have to rebuild a local military afterwards, the way they did
in Vietnam.
23 The final cause of asymmetry in casualties in this war stems from its nature as a war
against guerrillas and terrorists. Americans will try to destroy enemy units entirely. The
necessity  of  destroying guerrilla  forces  completely  is  the final  point  of  Frederick W.
Kagan’s  article,  “Ghosts  Against  Hinds,”  available  through  the  United  States  Army’s
Internet home page via the Military Academy site and selected for the special section on
the Afghanistan war.  The article compares the Soviet failure in Afghanistan with the
possibilities for American success. Several articles and collections of maps on the subject
of  Afghanistan  were  available  at  the  site  presumably  to  help  American soldiers  and
anyone else learn about Afghanistan, its sociology, history, geography, and the possibility
of changing its destiny by outside force. Far from displaying ignorance and naïveté on the
part of U. S. Military personnel, the cluster of sites called up by the Army’s home page
displays a good deal of scholarship, and the desire to diffuse that scholarship rapidly.
Some areas of the site required special access codes but much was readily available.17 
24 Kagan’s article focused on the Soviet defeat and related that failure to potential military
dangers to Americans.  First  he wrote of  the now familiar  ethnic and tribal  divisions
among the Afghans that make it so difficult to back a dominant group from the outside
that will be capable of forming a stable government. According to figures from 1980, the
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Pashtun comprised 6 million inhabitants out of a population of 15 million, making their
participation necessary for any settlement in spite of their close association with the
Taliban.  At  the  same  time  the  3  million  Tajiks  and  1  million  Uzbeks  dominate  the
Northern Alliance that was already fighting the Taliban. Kagan warned that though it
would be tempting for the United States to support the Northern Alliance, already in the
field, a policy seeking a long term political solution in Afghanistan will  require some
Pashtun cooperation. The Soviets, for ideological and historic reasons, had been obliged
to support a losing communist regime. Hence their war, very much like the American war
in Vietnam, supported an impossible policy.
25 Kagan’s second reason for Soviet defeat was the rough high mountainous geography of
Afghanistan,  which  acts  both  to  divide  up  large  invading  armies  into  small  units
vulnerable  to  guerrilla  attack,  and  to  squeeze  large  units  into  predictable  channels,
making  them  easy  to  ambush.  Afghanistan’s  mountain  borders  permit  clandestine
passage into neighboring countries where the different ethnic groups of Afghanistan can
easily find refuge and relief with neighbors, after an engagement, and from which they
can easily return to fight again.18 
26 The third reason for Soviet defeat that Kagan related to dangers to Americans, linked
advanced Soviet military technology with asymmetries of death in the war. The Soviets
relied on numerical superiority, and superior firepower. Kagan wrote that, “The Soviets
also relied on firepower in an effort to minimize their own casualties–and it is essential to
recognize that the Soviets in the 1980’s were every bit as casualty-averse as the American
Army is today.” Kagan pointed out, however, that Soviet firepower was badly directed by
badly trained soldiers. American firepower has been far better directed, often adjusted by
special  forces on the ground,  even against  “fleeting targets”–an improvement gained
from the experience of the Gulf War.19 According to reports, individual houses belonging
to Qaida associates were destroyed in Kabul with little damage to neighbors.20 Kagan
further pointed out the mediocre physical condition of Soviet soldiers reluctant to leave
their vehicles. As the Soviet war continued, very much along the lines of Vietnam, it
became more and more difficult for the Soviet army to operate away from a few cities
they controlled because their indiscriminate firepower had created enemies rather than
destroying them. As seen by Soviet ground soldiers, the solution for this lack of control in
the country was the application of ever more firepower.21
27 The most important mistake of all that the Soviets made, according to Kagan, was “their
inability to adjust their notions of victory and success to unfamiliar circumstances. The
most significant difficulty facing a counter-guerrilla force in Afghanistan’s terrain (and,
indeed, in most terrain) is that of bringing the guerrillas to battle on your own terms.
Once the guerrillas have been forced to fight, by whatever means, it is essential to destroy
the  guerrilla  force  in  its  entirety."22 In  conventional  war,  Kagan  wrote,  victory  is
determined by territory and objectives taken and the destruction of the enemy unit’s
combat effectiveness. The Soviet army of the 1980’s would claim victory when the enemy
units had suffered 10% or 20% casualties. The Soviets would have destroyed their enemy’s
combat capabilities for a time, but highly motivated and loosely organized, even in the
absence of their leaders, the guerrilla units could soon be back. By not counting correctly,
the Soviets made the same mistake in Afghanistan as Americans made in Vietnam.23
28 In an article that provides encouragement and solutions to conditions in Afghanistan,
Kagan described tactics capable of cutting off the retreat routes of guerrillas completely,
using  air  assault  reserves  for  “rapid  insertion  into  an  ongoing  fight.”24 The  tactics
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described by Kagan would require “daunting, and extensive training,” but they do not
seem beyond the capabilities of the new American reformed army with its “airland battle
doctrine,” and remarkable training programs.25 Kagan proposed total destruction of the
enemy while losing as few Americans as possible.
29 What effects this analysis of the necessity of total destruction of enemy guerrilla forces
may have already had is difficult to tell. But given the lessons of Vietnam, where kill
ratios  and  body  counts  were  supposed  to  lead  up  to  the  gradual  loss  of  the  North
Vietnamese will to fight, it is easy to see the logic of Kagan’s argument, and equally easy
to see the emotional and public relations necessity for obscuring the numbers of enemy
dead and their comparison with the numbers of America dead. American dead should be
honored and remembered for patriotic reasons and to keep up the moral of the American
forces.  The enemy’s  soldiers  should be forgotten as they were in numbers of  “killed
tanks,” of the Gulf War, rather than killed men in Vietnam.
30 From the point of view of American military culture, this asymmetry in the treatment of
casualties is completely legitimate. The reformed Army’s successful recruiting slogan, a
slogan that easily carries a message to the entire organization, is “An Army of One.” What
this slogan suggests is that every man or woman in the Army carries within himself or
herself  the essence–training,  expertise,  spirit–of  the whole organization.  At  the same
time, it means that the Army makes one, large organic or sometimes, mechanic, whole.
With either interpretation of the message, the loss of any member becomes a loss for the
whole, yet the organization can reconstitute itself with only a very few of these paragons
of training and spirit. The army must be able to rebuild from a few because it has already
been reduced to far below the number of effectives during the Cold War. This is an army
of survivors, not only of defeat in Vietnam, but also of reform and budget and personnel
cuts associated with the end of the Cold War. Its culture is one of constant transformation
towards something ever more powerful and more efficient, that trains each member to
his  or  her utmost.  There is  no room for the distinctions of  the “old army” between
volunteers and draftees, between national guardsmen and regular army, between men
and women. Even the distinction between officers and “men” fades in military literature
in which everyone is invited to be a “leader,” and the word officer almost never appears.26
In such a culture the loss of anyone is a loss for everyone and must be remembered and
honored by everyone.27
31 From the strategic point of view of the United States, this asymmetry is legitimate as well.
The war cannot be fought to bring the enemy to the negotiating table in the sense of
conventional wars fought between recognized states. Recognized states, using war as the
“continuation of policy,” to use the phrase coined by Carl von Clausewitz in On War after
the Napoleonic wars, leave the negotiating table to pursue their policies by violence, and
then return to the table when the situation has become altered in their favor or left them
too vulnerable to continue.28 The terrorist use of violence, disconnected from mandated
political  power  and  having  only  violence  as  means  to  pursue  policy,  places  the
negotiating table always well behind the foreground of violent action or confused with
the  violence.  Any  national  military  action  against  terrorists  will tend  to  return  the
monopoly of violent force to nations. Any military action of the United States will be
fought to reestablish American dominance in that field. Naming the terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center  and the  Pentagon “acts  of  war”  before  knowing for  certain
against whom that war should have to be fought, was already an attempt by the United
States to return violence to a realm where it can win. American military culture will
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always wish to wrest legitimacy away from practitioners of the “diplomacy of violence,”
used by terrorists, but that was also suggested in the word “compellence,” of Vietnam era
strategic thinking. The United States military will always set out to win decisively.
32 In an era when only the United States boasts that decisive capacity, this ability to pursue
total  victory can produce the asymmetries of  opinion quantified in Brian Knowlton’s
International Herald Tribune article already mentioned, but everywhere visible in the press
outside the United States.29 Other countries, even allies to the United States, are tempted
by the more limited “diplomacy of violence,” that the United States has rejected. When
France places a diplomat at the head of its service of military strategy, it must be a signal
that France has placed its military in a subordinate position to diplomats and has no
intention of  engaging in a decisive war in the manner of  the United States.  When a
general in Brussels says that European forces are not interested in “Warfighting,” the
alternative is the limited deployment of violence for diplomatic gains. Such differences
leave the American military isolated in its special, and at the moment, victorious culture
of successful decisive engagement where the military delivers the negotiating positions to
the politicians  and diplomats.  American unilateral  decisions  are  an inevitable  result,
objectionable as that may be to allies. 
33 The surviving officers of the United States Vietnam war probably understand isolation as
well as anyone. Their careers have been spent reforming the current U. S. Army in the
face of negative public opinion and a strategic consensus that has called into doubt the
purpose of overwhelming force. Their pride resides in having proved themselves right to
their own satisfaction in Panama, Grenada, and then more significantly in the Gulf War
and  now  in  Afghanistan.  The  United  States  military  can  and  does  deliver  decisive
victories according to official military historians such as Brig. Gen. Robert H. Scales, Jr. in
Certain Victory: The U. S. Army in the Gulf War, a book not only about the Gulf War, but the
post Vietnam reforms and the series of successful military engagements of the United
States  since  the  military  nadir  of  the  1970’s.  Violence  can  succeed  without  being
diplomatic.
34 How political masters manage the negotiations after victories stays a separate matter.
The reformed military prides itself on its public and conscientious subordination to the
elected Federal Government. The small group of four star generals who direct the United
States Army, among the few Vietnam veterans left in the military, have a lively memory
of the disastrous lack of candor between the Congress and General Westmoreland. They
remember the growing mistrust between the American public and the military through
the Vietnam years. American military culture for the moment is balanced between the
competence  and  reputation  of  elite  forces  created  for  highly-specialized  operations
involving technologically-sophisticated equipment yet who are led by men who maintain
a humble stance of subordination to civil authority.30
35 The spectacle of unrivaled United States military power and the asymmetries it produces
causes concern as the United States tends towards unilateral policies. Most likely, the
United  States  Military  leadership  will  face  down  criticisms  from  outside,  while
maintaining strict obedience to its political superiors, a situation that will not inspire
confidence abroad. The real worry,  however,  is not the military held in check at the
moment  by  its  culture  of  subordination  and  memories  of  Vietnam:  defeat  by  a
technologically and numerically inferior enemy, and separation from the approbation of
the American people. The real danger lies in a conservative political culture headed by
people who have forgotten that defeat of an Army in which they had not wished to serve,
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and now think of as invincible. Republican leaders since Ronald Reagan, most of whom
avoided the draft in the Vietnam days, blame the Vietnam defeat on a liberal society that
withdrew its support from the military while pursuing domestic social equality through
the Civil  Rights Movement and Affirmative action.  Maintaining a powerful  consensus
behind military activities, keeping the population focused on the horrors of September
11, 2001 and the need to prevent the repetition of such events and avenge such events
suits  an  anti-liberal  agenda  that  repudiates  the  Vietnam  years,  while  ignoring  the
importance of that defeat in creating the military tool those political leaders now have at
their disposal. The ironic situation in the George W. Bush cabinet of Secretary of State,
Colin Powell, the dovish military man, Donald Rumsfeld, the hawkish civilian Secretary of
Defense is explained by their differing stances towards Vietnam. Powell knows that it
took defeat to build the army into the highly trained, high moral organization it is today,
and that the memory of Vietnam protects the military from falling into certain traps.
Rumsfeld sees only a means of erasing the memory of the Vietnam days through the
successful deployment of today’s forces.
36 For the moment, the remarkably powerful army can keep its constitutionally appointed
place in subordination to civil  authority. But civil  authority, in the Administration of
George W. Bush, and his attorney general John Ashcroft, seem bent on using military
authority as a model for non-military matters. For example, the proposal of “Military
tribunals,” for people accused of terrorist acts and the suspension of civil rights for those
thus accused is presented by the Administration as a necessary act during a military
emergency. In fact, however, it is a sign of executive usurpation of powers pretending to
use the example of military efficiency. The proposed exceptional “Military tribunals,” will
be carried out according to exceptional rules, that is to say, according to rules established
by the Bush administration for this special case, not according to the established Code of
Military Justice, which offers many of the protections of American civil justice including
recourse to appeals courts and the supreme court. But this is an example of the current
conservative political culture in action, rather than that of the reformed military. The
reformed military will wish to attract as little attention as possible to enemy casualties,
including judicially prosecuted casualties, of this war.
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RÉSUMÉS
Dans cet article, Mark Meigs explique les ressorts profonds des choix stratégiques américains
dans la conduite de la guerre en Afghanistan. Il  montre en particulier comment ceux-ci sont
basés sur l'expérience américaine au Vietnam, qui a conduit à une profonde restructuration de la
doctrine, et font l'originalité de la culture militaire américaine.
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